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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
The issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred 
in temporarily sealing the initial filings and hearings 
concerning a contempt motion filed under Fed. R. Crim. P. 
6(e)(2) pending its determination whether secr et grand jury 
material would be disclosed. Our opinion in United States 
v. Smith, 123 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 1997), provides the rule of 
decision in this matter. We will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
On February 13, 2001, the Newark Star Ledger 
discovered that a motion had been filed under seal in 
District Court. The Star Ledger believed the motion sought 
contempt proceedings against United States Justice 
Department attorneys or agents for leaking secret grand 
jury information to the media, in violation of Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 6(e)(2).1 The Star Ledger filed a motion to intervene and 
to unseal the motion. After granting the motion to 
intervene, the District Court conducted a bifur cated hearing 
to determine whether the motion should be unsealed and 
whether subsequent filings and proceedings should be 
sealed. The first hearing occurred in a closed session. 
 
After the initial hearing, the court opened the pr oceedings 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6 (e)(2) provides, "[A]n attorney for the government 
. . . shall not disclose matters occurring befor e the grand jury . . . . 
A 
knowing violation of Rule 6 may be punished as a contempt of court." 
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stating it had made a "preliminary deter mination to deny 
access to all the filings and proceedings" holding that "at 
least for now [it] should not and must not open [the] 
proceedings to the public because of its grand jury context." 
The Star Ledger contended the motion for contempt 
proceedings did not implicate grand jury infor mation. For 
this reason, it argued the motion and pr oceedings were 
entitled to a presumption of openness under Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 6 (e)(5).2 But the District Court held the filings "related to 
grand jury proceedings" and under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(6)3 
and United States v. Smith, 123 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 1997), 
they must remain sealed pending a deter mination whether 
secret grand jury information was implicated. After making 
this determination, the District Court stated it would open 
all non-secret filings and proceedings. 4 The Star Ledger 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(5) provides,"Closed Hearing. Subject to any right 
to an open hearing in contempt proceedings, the court shall order a 
hearing on matters affecting a grand jury pr oceeding to be closed to the 
extent necessary to prevent disclosure of matters occurring before a 
grand jury." 
3. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(6) provides,"Sealed Records. Records, orders, 
and subpoenas relating to grand jury pr oceedings shall be kept under 
seal to the extent and for such time as is necessary to prevent disclosure 
of matters occurring before a grand jury." 
4. In open session, the court stated, 
 
       [A]s everyone knows, we have in these papers allegations that well 
       recognized principles of grand jury secr ecy have been violated, 
and 
       there are some specifics in the papers .. . . [I]n my judgment, it 
       would be inappropriate to disclose them at this time, and 
       inappropriate in the sense that allegations, if disclosed, would 
       necessarily disclose at least one party's view as to what went on 
       before a grand jury. 
 
       *  *  * 
 
       I agree that absent the grand jury aspect of this case, the 
situation 
       of a citizen who happens to be a United States Senator complaining 
       about improper activities by the executive branch would be a matter 
       of intense public interest. That goes without saying. 
 
       But the motion before me is in the context of grand jury 
proceedings 
       and that puts it in an entirely differ ent light, and requires me 
to 
       evaluate the presumption of public access in the context of the 
       countervailing presumption of grand jury secr ecy. 
 
       I am satisfied that these allegations and these pr oceedings must 
       remain under seal. 
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appealed.5 
 
II. 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
S 401. We have jurisdiction over afinal order denying 
access to court records and proceedings under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. United States v. Antar, 38 F .3d 1348, 1355-56 (3d 
Cir. 1994) ("[O]rders either granting or denying access to 
portions of a trial record are appealable as final orders 
pursuant to S 1291."); United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 
836 (3d Cir. 1994) (court order denying public access to 
post-trial proceedings was final order and appealable under 
S 1291). We exercise plenary r eview over the District Court's 
decision to deny access to and seal trial recor ds. Antar, 38 
F.3d at 1357. Although we generally r eview factual findings 
for clear error, when the First Amendment is implicated, we 
exercise independent appellate review. On a First 
Amendment right of access claim, our scope of r eview of 
factual findings "is substantially broader than that for 
abuse of discretion." Smith, 123 F .3d at 146. 
 
III. 
 
The Supreme Court has recognized a First Amendment 
right of access to most criminal proceedings. See, e.g., 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 578 
(1980); Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 
589, 597 (1978) ("It is clear that the courts of this country 
recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records 
and documents, including judicial recor ds and 
documents."); Antar, 38 F.3d at 1359-60. This right of 
access promotes important societal inter ests including 
confidence in the judicial system. See, e.g. , Press-Enterprise 
Co. v. Super. Ct., 478 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1986); Leucadia, Inc. v. 
Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F .2d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 
1993). We have extended this right of access to many pre- 
trial criminal proceedings including pr e-trial suppression, 
due process, and entrapment hearings.6 United States v. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The New Jersey Press Association filed an amicus curiae brief arguing 
the District Court erred in sealing the pr oceedings. 
6. In Richmond Newspapers, Inc., the Supr eme Court held the 
presumption of openness in criminal proceedings extends beyond the 
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Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 554 (3d Cir . 1982). But this right of 
access is not unlimited. Under certain circumstances the 
right of public access may be outweighed by countervailing 
principles.7 United States v. Smith, 787 F.2d 111, 114 (3d 
Cir. 1986). Among the few limitations to the First 
Amendment right of access in criminal hearings, none is 
more important than protecting grand jury secrecy. Douglas 
Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops N.W. , 441 U.S. 211, 218 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
trial to many other stages of a criminal case including preliminary 
hearings and post trial proceedings. 448 U.S. at 573. The Supreme 
Court has developed a two part test to deter mine whether the First 
Amendment right of access attaches to a particular stage of a criminal 
proceeding. See Press-Enterprise Co. , 478 U.S. at 8-9. This test asks 
whether (1) experience and (2) logic favor public access. Id. Under the 
experience prong, courts consider whether "the place and process have 
historically been open to the press and the general public." Id. at 8. 
Under the logic prong, courts consider whether"public access plays a 
significant positive role in the particular process in question." Id. In 
making this logic determination courts look to six factors, 
 
       [Whether access] (1) Promot[es] . .. informed discussion of 
       government affairs by providing the public with [a] more complete 
       understanding of the judicial system; (2) pr omot[es] . . . the 
public 
       perception of fairness which can be achieved only by permitting 
full 
       public view of the proceedings; (3) provid[es] a significant 
       therapeutic value as an outlet for community concer n, hostility, 
and 
       emotion; (4) serv[es] as a check on corrupt practices by exposing 
the 
       judicial process to public scrutiny; (5) enhanc[es] . . . the 
       performances of all involved; and (6) discourag[es] . . . perjury. 
 
United States v. Smith, 787 F.2d 111, 114 (3d Cir. 1986) (summarizing 
United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 556 (3d Cir. 1982)). 
 
7. Even if experience and logic favor a pr esumption of access, a court 
may still seal a proceeding if closure is justified by overriding 
principles. 
Press-Enterprise Co., 478 U.S. at 9 (wher e the constitutional right of 
access exists, "proceedings cannot be closed unless . . . closure is 
essential to preserve higher values and is narr owly tailored to serve 
that 
interest"). The court must make "particularized findings on the record" 
when it closes proceedings despite finding a presumption of access. Id. 
These findings must " `establish[ ] the existence of a compelling 
governmental interest, and . . . demonstrat[e] that absent limited 
restrictions upon the right to access, that other interest[s] would be 
substantially impaired.' " Smith,123 F.3d at 147 (quoting Antar, 38 F.3d 
at 1359). 
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(1979). The Supreme Court has held that grand jury 
proceedings must remain secret noting, 
 
       [S]everal distinct interests [ar e] served by safeguarding 
       the confidentiality of grand jury proceedings. First, if 
       preindictment proceedings were made public, many 
       prospective witnesses would be hesitant to come 
       forward voluntarily, knowing that those against whom 
       they testify would be aware of that testimony. 
       Moreover, witnesses who appear befor e the grand jury 
       would be less likely to testify fully and frankly, as they 
       would be open to retribution as well as inducements. 
       There also would be the risk that those about to be 
       indicted would flee, or would try to influence individual 
       jurors to vote against indictment. Finally, by preserving 
       the secrecy of the proceedings, we assur e that persons 
       who are accused but exonerated by the grand jury will 
       not be held up to public ridicule. 
 
Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 218-19 (inter nal citations 
omitted). 
 
In United States v. Smith, 123 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 1997), we 
held the broad secrecy historically af forded to grand jury 
proceedings should, in certain circumstances, extend to 
non-grand jury proceedings when secret grand jury 
material may be disclosed. We also held ther e is no 
presumptive First Amendment or common law right of 
access to court documents that involve materials pr esented 
before a grand jury, including initial motions,filings and 
proceedings alleging contempt under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e). 
Smith, 123 F.3d at 150 ("[I]f the district court seals a 
proceeding or brief because it would disclose grand jury 
matters, there is no First Amendment right of access to it 
even if it also concerns possible impr oper actions by 
government officials."). 
 
A. 
 
In Smith, the Newark Star Ledger sought access to 
records and proceedings in the sentencing phase of a 
criminal proceeding. The underlying criminal case in Smith 
involved participants in a state lottery kickback scheme 
who were convicted on various felony char ges. Before 
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sentencing, the government submitted its sentencing 
recommendations to the court. The memorandum also 
referenced other uncharged individuals allegedly involved in 
the kickback scheme. After submitting the memorandum to 
the court, the government made the memorandum public 
by placing it on its website and providing copies to the 
media. 
 
The uncharged individuals maintained the gover nment's 
disclosure of the memorandum which included the identity 
of grand jury witnesses violated Fed. R. Crim. P . 6(e). The 
District Court ordered the government to remove the 
sentence memorandum from its website pending a 
determination whether it actually contained grand jury 
material. The court also ordered the parties to file under 
seal any further motions and documents concer ning the 
potential Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) violation. The court stated 
that it would determine at a later date "whether there is 
sufficient implication of Rule 6(e) . . . to warrant closure" of 
future proceedings. Smith, 123 F .3d at 145. Subsequently, 
the government and the uncharged individuals filed briefs 
under seal. 
 
The Newark Star Ledger moved to intervene to obtain the 
parties' motions and filings and to have access to further 
proceedings. Denying the newspaper's request for access, 
the court reasoned "the very reason[the briefs are] sealed 
is there may be material in them which af fects Rule 6(e)." 
Id. After review, the court said it would disclose all non- 
grand jury materials. The Star Ledger appealed contending 
it had a First Amendment and common law right of access 
to all this information. 
 
Recognizing the First Amendment right of access to pre- 
trial criminal proceedings, we held ther e was no right of 
access when grand jury materials are involved, stating that 
 
       Douglas Oil [ ] implicitly makes clear that grand jury 
       proceedings are not subject to a First Amendment right 
       of access under the test of `experience and logic.' 
       Historically, such proceedings have been closed to the 
       public. Moreover, public access to grand jury 
       proceedings would hinder, rather than further, the 
       efficient functioning of the proceedings. 
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Id. at 148. Observing that the secrecy of grand jury 
proceedings also extends to collateral pr oceedings 
containing grand jury material, we stated, "Rather than 
according secrecy only to grand jury pr oceedings 
themselves, the rules provide a presumption of secrecy to 
all proceedings that `affect' grand jury proceedings. 
Concomitantly, not only are grand jury materials 
themselves to be kept secret, but so ar e all materials that 
`relate to' grand jury proceedings." Id. at 149; see also In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena (Doe No. 4 v. Doe No. 1), 103 F.3d 
234, 237 (2d Cir. 1996) ("The plain language of the Rule 
shows that Congress intended for its confidentiality 
provisions to cover matters beyond those actually occurring 
before the grand jury."). Fed. R. Crim. P . 6(e)(6) provides 
that "[r]ecords, orders, and subpoenas relating to grand jury 
proceedings shall be kept under seal to the extent and for 
such time as is necessary to prevent disclosur e of matters 
occurring before a grand jury." (emphasis added). Similarly, 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(5) provides, "Subject to any right to an 
open hearing in contempt proceedings, the court shall order 
a hearing on matters affecting a grand jury pr oceeding to 
be closed to the extent necessary to prevent disclosure of 
matters occurring before a grand jury." 
 
Applying these rules, we stated the critical question in 
determining whether to unseal the proceedings and 
materials relating to the uncharged individuals' motion was 
"whether [they] w[ould] disclose grand jury matters so that 
they `affect' or `relate to' grand jury proceedings within the 
meaning of Rule 6(e)(5) and 6(e)(6)." Smith , 123 F.3d at 150 
(citing 1 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and 
Procedure S 106, at 250 (1982) ("The rule of secrecy applies 
. . . to anything that might tend to reveal what happened in 
the grand jury room.")); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 6 advisory 
committee's note ("[Rule 6(e)(5)] make[s] it clear that certain 
hearings which would reveal matters which have previously 
occurred before a grand jury or ar e likely to occur before a 
grand jury with respect to a pending or ongoing 
investigation must be conducted in camera in whole or in 
part in order to prevent public disclosur e of such secret 
information."). We concluded the materials at issue (i.e., the 
sentencing memorandum and the filings surr ounding it) 
were sufficiently related to grand jury proceedings so that 
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disclosure could potentially interrupt and af fect the grand 
jury proceedings. Smith, 123 F.3d at 150. 
 
Although the pending motions in Smith wer e post-trial 
motions, the heart of the alleged misconduct was an 
allegation that the government disclosed secr et grand jury 
information. Id. at 149. We stated, 
 
       [T]he ultimate issue to be decided by the district court 
       is whether attorneys for the government committed any 
       wrongdoing [but] . . ., this question cannot be resolved 
       without the district court's determining whether that 
       sentencing memorandum includes Rule 6(e) material. 
       Thus the focus of the proceedings befor e the district 
       court is on the question whether the disputed material 
       contained in the sentencing memorandum is in fact 
       grand jury material. In this proceeding, grand jury 
       matters may potentially be disclosed. 
 
Id. at 150. 
 
We stated, "A court should close a hearing to decide 
whether disclosure is warranted if that hearing would 
necessarily disclose grand jury matters." Id.  (emphasis in 
original). Therefore, the District Court in Smith did not err 
in initially sealing the motions and proceedings because, 
 
       Faced with a bona fide claim that 6(e) material was 
       disclosed in the sentencing memorandum, the [district] 
       court prevented further disclosures of that material, 
       thereby preserving the "status quo," while the parties 
       briefed the question and the court brought them in for 
       a hearing . . . . If the district court made [the 6(e)] 
       determination in a public proceeding, it would further 
       disseminate the potential secrets in doing so. 
 
Id. at 152. There was another r eason for sealing the 
proceedings. The government intended to present actual 
grand jury material to prove that it did not unlawfully 
disclose grand jury secrets in the sentence memorandum in 
violation of Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e). Because the government 
averred it was going to present actual grand jury material 
in the proceedings, an ex parte in camera  examination was 
appropriate to prevent disclosure. Id. at 151 (citing In re 
Grand Jury, 103 F.3d 1140 (3d Cir . 1997) ("Ex parte in 
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camera hearings have been held proper in or der to preserve 
the ongoing interest in grand jury secr ecy.")). 
 
Addressing the Star Ledger's argument that the District 
Court should have redacted the briefs and filings and 
provided public access to all non-grand jury information, 
we found no error in the determination to seal all the 
proceedings because, 
 
       [T]he district court simply cannot deter mine what 
       material is secret and what can be disclosed to the 
       public without determining whether the sentencing 
       memorandum contains Rule 6(e) material. Yet that 
       decision, in turn, cannot be made without the benefit 
       of the briefs and in particular, without the benefit of 
       oral argument. 
 
       * * * 
 
       Under these circumstances requiring access to some 
       aspects of the hearing will be cumbersome, impractical, 
       and inefficient. 
 
Id. at 153. 
 
In Smith, we concluded the District Court pr operly sealed 
all the materials until such time as it decided what, if any, 
grand jury secrets were implicated. Per mitting public 
access to certain portions of the filings and pr oceedings 
while excluding them from other portions of the proceeding 
would create a "revolving door" hearing. Id. "Courts cannot 
conduct their business that way, and we will not tie the 
hands of the district court in this fashion." Id. 
 
B. 
 
We believe Smith controls her e. The District Court had to 
first determine whether the information alleged to have 
been leaked implicated secret grand jury infor mation before 
determining whether to initiate contempt pr oceedings. As 
we held in Smith, "[A] court should close a hearing to decide 
whether disclosure is warranted if that hearing would 
necessarily disclose grand jury matters." 123 F .3d at 150. 
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Premature disclosure might divulge secret grand jury 
information.8 
 
Furthermore, the government r epresented that in future 
hearings concerning the motion it intended to present 
undisclosed grand jury material in order to pr ove that no 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) violation occurr ed. In these 
circumstances, the court properly sealed the proceedings 
pending its initial determination of whether secret grand 
jury material was implicated. Id. at 152; see accord In re 
Motions of Dow Jones & Co. Inc., 142 F.3d 496, 501 (D.C. 
Cir.) ("As a matter of judicial administration, initially closing 
all ancillary proceedings makes good sense. If a hearing is 
about something `affecting' a grand jury investigation, there 
will nearly always be a danger of revealing grand jury 
matters."), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 820 (1998). 
 
But the Star Ledger contends the District Court could 
have simply redacted grand jury information and permitted 
access to the rest of the materials.9  See In re Dow Jones, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. As we stated in Smith, "[Supr eme Court precedent] implicitly makes 
clear that grand jury proceedings are not subject to a First Amendment 
right of access under the test of `experience and logic.' " 123 F.3d at 
150; 
see also S. Beale, et al., 1 Grand Jury Law & Practice S 5:8.1 (2d ed. 
2000) ("Unlike other criminal proceedings to which a First Amendment 
right of access has been found, there is no tradition of openness in 
grand jury proceedings. The tradition of secr ecy extends to proceedings 
ancillary to a grand jury investigation, and ther eby precludes any First 
Amendment right of access to those proceedings.") (footnotes omitted). 
Regardless of the intense public interest in this matter, when grand jury 
material is implicated there is no presumptive First Amendment right of 
access to the material. Smith, 123 F .3d at 150 ("[I]f the district court 
seals a proceeding or brief because it would disclose grand jury matters, 
there is no First Amendment right of access to it even if it also concerns 
possible improper actions by government officials."). 
 
9. On appeal the Star Ledger and amicus contend that even if we do not 
find a presumption of access under "experience and logic," the District 
Court's closure of all the proceedings was not narrowly tailored. See 
Press-Enterprise, Co., 479 U.S. at 9 (once a presumptive right of access 
is found, this may be overcome "only by an overriding interest based on 
findings that closure is essential to pr eserve higher values and is 
narrowly tailored to serve that interest."). Nor did the District Court 
here 
issue particularized findings identifying a compelling governmental 
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142 F.3d at 502 ("In all events, if the[court] can allow some 
public access without risking disclosure of grand jury 
matters -- either because of the subject of the pr oceedings 
removes the danger or because the proceedings may be 
structured to prevent the risk without disruption or delay, 
Rule 6(e)(5) contemplates that this shall be done.") (internal 
citation omitted). It contends that the court could have 
revealed the names of the parties alleged to have leaked the 
information, without revealing matters currently before the 
grand jury. We disagree. The District Court properly 
recognized that it was required to determine whether secret 
grand jury information was leaked, and whether the 
information in the complaining party's motion implicated 
secret grand jury material. As we held in Smith, the better 
practice is to initially seal the entire pr oceedings and 
 
       inform[ ] the parties that [the court] will disclose all 
       nonsecret aspects of . . . the briefs, and the hearing as 
       soon as it determines which aspects of those papers 
       and proceedings are secret . . . .[T]hat access is 
       enough to satisfy any right of access that the 
       newspapers may have to the nonsecret aspects of the 
       proceedings. 
 
123 F.3d at 153-54. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
interest which would be impaired if the pr oceedings were not sealed. 
Smith, 123 F.3d at 147 (court must "establish the existence of a 
compelling governmental interest and . . . demonstrat[e] that absent 
limited restrictions upon the right to access that other interests would 
be 
substantially impaired"). 
 
But we see no error. As we held in Smith, once the court finds that 
neither experience nor logic require a pr esumptive First Amendment 
right of access, there is no need to addr ess whether the court's actions 
were narrowly tailored. 123 F.3d at 151 (once court determines there is 
no presumptive First Amendment right of access, the "inquiry ends 
[t]here, and [there is no need] to reach the question whether the district 
court made particularized findings that the need for closure outweighed 
the interest in public access"). 
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C. 
 
1. 
 
On appeal, the Star Ledger attempts to distinguish Smith 
on the facts. It contends the complaining parties in Smith 
(i.e., the uncharged individuals mentioned in the sentence 
memorandum) actually appeared before the grand jury, but 
here, it claims the complaining party was neither a target 
of an investigation nor a witness before the grand jury. For 
this reason, it argues, permitting access to the motions and 
filings would have revealed only what a non-witness, 
without knowledge of grand jury testimony, believed was 
secret grand jury information. Because the complaining 
party lacked "actual knowledge" of what occurr ed before the 
grand jury, the Star Ledger contends the filings and 
proceedings would not have revealed any grand jury 
secrets. Disclosure, therefor e, would not have violated Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 6(e) because the motion was based merely on 
"rumor, innuendo, speculation, and infor mation already in 
the public domain."10 Br . of amicus curiae at 4. 
 
But the complaining party's "knowledge" is immaterial 
during the initial stages of a Rule 6(e) proceeding. Because 
a motion alleging government misconduct may contain 
potential grand jury secrets, Fed. R. Crim. P . 6(e) requires 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Amicus argue the complaining party's allegation was based on 
information already reported in the press and therefore was not secret 
information. See In re Dow Jones, 142 F.3d at 505 ("It is true that`Rule 
6(e) does not create a type of secrecy which is waived once public 
disclosure occurs' . . . . But it is also true that `when information is 
sufficiently widely known . . . it has lost its character as Rule 6(e) 
material.' ") (quoting In re North, 16 F.3d 1234, 1245 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). 
But even if the motion is based on information already reported in the 
media, this information may still be secr et grand jury material. As we 
held in Smith, 
 
       [I]t is clear to us that a court is simply not powerless, in the 
face of 
       an unlawful disclosure of grand jury secr ets, to prevent all 
further 
       disclosures by the government of those same jury secrets. In other 
       words, even if grand jury secrets ar e publicly disclosed, they may 
       still be entitled to at least some protection from disclosure. 
 
123 F.3d at 154. 
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the proceedings be initially sealed until the court can 
determine what, if any, secret grand jury information is 
implicated. Smith, 123 F.3d at 152. 
 
2. 
 
The Star Ledger also contends that under Fed. R. Crim. 
P. 6(e) grand jury contempt proceedings are presumptively 
open to the public and should be closed only to the extent 
necessary to prevent improper disclosure.11 See In Re Grand 
Jury Investigation (DiLoreto), 903 F .2d 180, 182 (3d Cir. 
1990). But the Star Ledger's reliance on DiLoreto is 
misplaced. DiLoreto did not involve grand jury secrets or 
even grand jury testimony. In DiLoreto  we held the district 
court should disclose the termination date of a grand jury 
investigation so that an individual held in contempt for 
refusal to testify would be put on notice when his contempt 
status would end.12 Id. at 183-84 (discussing survey "which 
reveals that in the vast majority of United States District 
Courts, the commencement and termination dates of the 
grand jury are matters of public recor d"). The public 
disclosure in DiLoreto, ther efore, did not implicate secret 
grand jury testimony. 
 
3. 
 
The Star Ledger's contention that only "cor e" grand jury 
material is subject to disclosure is not supported by case 
law. Smith, 123 F.3d at 149 (" `The plain language of . . . 
Rule [6(e)] shows that Congress intended for its 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. In connection with this argument the Star ledger notes that in 
contrast to Smith where there was no independent right of public access 
to the leaked document, (i.e., the sentencing memorandum) here there is 
a presumptive right of access to filings in a contempt motion. It argues 
that in Smith the sentence memorandum was pr esumptively confidential 
under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32, while in the pr esent case there is a 
historically rooted practice of openness in contempt proceedings. 
 
But this distinction is not dispositive. The pr esumption of open access 
is lost once grand jury materials are pr esent. Smith, 123 F.3d at 148-49. 
 
12. DiLoreto was being held in custody until the termination of the grand 
jury investigation. 
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confidentiality provisions to cover matters beyond those 
actually occurring before the grand jury.' ") (quoting In Re 
Grand Jury Subpoena, 103 F.3d at 237). The secrecy 
afforded to grand jury materials under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e) 
extends beyond the actual grand jury proceeding to 
collateral matters, including contempt proceedings, which 
relate to grand jury proceedings and may potentially reveal 
grand jury information. Id. ("[N]ot only are grand jury 
materials themselves to be kept secret, but so are all 
materials that `relate to' grand jury pr oceedings."). For this 
reason, we believe the District Court pr operly delayed 
public access to the materials and proceedings until a 
proper determination could be made whether the motion 
implicated secret grand jury information. Id. at 153. 
 
4. 
 
The Star Ledger also contends Fed. R. Crim. P . 6(e)(5) 
provides that contempt proceedings ar e presumptively 
entitled to public access, even when grand jury material is 
present. It cites a series of cases wher e courts have held 
that contempt proceedings should be open to the public. 
See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); In re Iowa Freedom of 
Info. Council, 724 F.2d 658, 661 (8th Cir . 1983) ("[T]he 
protection of the First Amendment extends to pr oceedings 
for contempt, a hybrid containing both civil and criminal 
characteristics.");13 In re Rosahn, 671 F.2d 690, 697 (2d Cir. 
1982). 
 
But these cases only address the adjudicative process. In 
re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 273 (holding one man grand jury that 
held witness in contempt and sentenced him to prison was 
contempt proceeding to which there was a right to public 
access);14 In re Rosahn, 671 F.2d at 697 ("[A] contempttrial 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The Star Ledger's reliance on In r e Iowa Freedom of Information 
Council, 724 F.2d at 661, is misplaced because it does not address the 
secrecy afforded to grand jury materials but rather whether trade secrets 
are entitled to secrecy. As we noted in Smith, when grand jury material 
is at issue, the First Amendment right of access demands a different 
analysis. Smith, 123 F.3d at 150. 
 
14. In In re Oliver, the Court stated, 
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may properly be closed to the public when substantive 
grand jury matters are being considered.") (emphasis 
added)). Here, the initial motions and hearings did not 
involve adjudicative procedures in a contempt proceeding. 
The District Court was at the preliminary stage of sorting 
out whether secret grand jury material was implicated. 
 
As the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit r ecently 
recognized there are several stages to a criminal contempt 
proceeding, explaining, 
 
       First, the district court must determine whether the 
       plaintiff has established a prima facie  case [i.e., that a 
       Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2) violation has occurr ed] . . . . 
       Second, if the court determines that a prima facie case 
       has been established, the burden shifts to the 
       government to "attempt to explain its actions" in a 
       show cause hearing. If the government fails to rebut 
       the prima facie case, a violation of Rule 6(e)(2) is 
       deemed to have occurred . . . . The court then 
       determines what remedy will be sufficient. 
 
In re Sealed Case No. 98-3077, 151 F .3d 1059, 1067-68 
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). Here, the 
District Court had not even reached the first stage, whether 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       In the case before us, the petitioner was called as a witness to 
       testify in secret before a one-man grand jury conducting a grand 
       jury investigation. In the midst of petitioner's testimony the 
       proceedings abruptly changed. The investigation became a `trial,' 
the 
       grand jury became a judge, and the witness became an accused 
       charged with contempt of court -- all in secret. Following a 
charge, 
       conviction and sentence, the petitioner was lead away to prison-- 
       still without any break in the secrecy. 
 
       *  *  * 
 
       In view of this nation's historic distrust of secr et proceedings, 
their 
       inherent dangers to freedom, and the universal requirement of our 
       federal and state governments that criminal trials be public, the 
       Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that no one shall be deprived of 
       his liberty without due process of law means at least that an 
       accused cannot be thus sentenced to prison. 
 
333 U.S. at 272-73. 
 
                                17 
  
the complaining party had established a prima facie case of 
a Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(2) violation. Rather the court was 
making an initial determination of whether the information 
in the motion implicated grand jury materials.15 As we held 
in Smith, this initial stage may be closed so long as, upon 
motion, the court re-opens the adjudication pr oceedings.16 
123 F.3d at 149 n.13 ("All that must be accessible to 
public, upon the contemnor's request, is the`final stage' of 
contempt proceedings."); see also Levine v. United States, 
362 U.S. 610, 618 (1960) (during "final stages" of a 
contempt proceeding the courtroom should be "opened so 
that the act of contempt, and the consequent adjudication 
and sentence might occur in public."), r eh'g denied, 363 
U.S. 858 (1960).17 
 
5. 
 
In sum, the District Court properly sealed the initial 
filings and motions so that it could deter mine whether 
secret grand jury information was implicated. The court 
held that after it determined what, if any, information was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. The Star Ledger argues that we should adopt a rule that both pre- 
contempt and actual contempt proceedings ar e presumptively open to 
the public because all stages of a contempt pr oceeding involve 
considerations of due process to which the public has a right to be 
informed. It argues that to the extent grand jury material is present in 
the initial stages of a contempt proceeding the court should redact any 
grand jury material from the otherwise open pr oceedings. 
 
We decline to adopt such a rule. As we held in Smith, when 
information relating to a grand jury investigation is present in the 
initial 
stages of a contempt proceeding, there is no presumption of public 
access and the court must prevent the disclosur e of this secret grand 
jury material by sealing the proceedings. 123 F .3d at 151 ("[T]he briefs 
and hearing will necessarily reveal grand jury material . . . . Not only 
was the district court justified in sealing them, it was required to do so 
absent a showing of an overriding interest."). 
 
16. Of course, during this final contempt adjudication, the court may 
redact any materials that reveal secr et grand jury information. 
 
17. We need not address the Star Ledger's argument that the Smith court 
erred in stating that access to final contempt proceedings is limited to 
the alleged contemnor and does not permit access to the general public. 
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secret grand jury material, it would open the proceedings 
and disclose all non-grand jury materials. W e see no error.18 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affir m the judgment of 
the District Court. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. On June 20, 2001 the District Court issued afinal order denying the 
complaining party's motion for contempt proceedings. But the District 
Court did not unseal all the records pertaining to the motion nor did it 
lift the seal on future proceedings. Under Smith, we believe the District 
Court should complete its review of the pr oceedings and after 
determining what, if any, materials contain secret grand jury 
information, unseal all non-secret material. 
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